ABSTRACT
By August 1969, when the situation in Belfast was very serious, the Irish authorities insisted on referring to the 'Six Counties' of Northern Ireland to stress its diminutive status and appealed to the United Nations for the urgent despatch of a peace-keeping force. On 19 August the British government produced what became known as the (first) Downing Street Declaration which affirmed 'that responsibility for affairs in Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction'. A day later Patrick Hillery, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, requested by virtue of Article 35 of the UN Charter 'an urgent meeting of the Security Council' to consider the crisis. The general demeanour of Hillery and of Lord Caradon, the British representative, suggests that what mattered on this occasion was catharsis, and that the setting was being used as a form of 'sacred drama'. In practice the Irish had little choice and were reduced to pursuing a policy of 'quiet diplomacy and personal conversation' (the Taoiseach's address to the UN, 22 October 1970) and to acting as 'second guarantor' for the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland.
