ABSTRACT
The term “Beijing Consensus” has been used by many different people in very different contexts. Besides its catchy nature, there has actually been very little real consensus about what it really signifies. It has been used by both those who fear and those who celebrate China’s rise. It has been common to equate it with the “China model” to suggest the possibility that other developing countries can learn from its success. This interest has been driven by the country’s growing political and economic influence around the world. However, much of what is considered to be part of the “China model” can also be found in the discourse of the “Singapore model” which Chinese observers have for quite some time regarded as a valuable role model for the country’s development. The most important aspect behind these discourses is the claim of an alternative authoritarian state-capitalist model that competes with the idea of a market-based liberal democratic model. But does authoritarian state capitalism really have a long-term future? Or is it merely a transitory phase in the development of a country? This chapter aims to weigh the different arguments of the Chinese discussion about the “Singapore model” to demonstrate the weaknesses in the argument for an alternative authoritarian state-capitalist model and reinforce the notion that political development in the form of democratization will eventually follow economic development even if the pace of that development is uncertain. An alternative authoritarian regime form, i.e. Asian authoritarianism, that is superior to democracy, is therefore not a serious contender to liberal democracy in the long run.
