ABSTRACT

At the time of the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the political and economic elites (and the majority of the population for that matter) of each of these countries were faced with very different situations, which resulted in different positions vis-à-vis the European Union (EU). There were, of course, several basic common points which made the EU an attractive proposition: in economic terms it offered integration into the European capitalist market economy (which would guarantee systemic change, higher growth rates and abundant donations and investments from the EU); in political terms it provided a ‘fast-track’ accession process to EU membership (which would secure not only the best way to achieve the first (economic) goal but also would guarantee a radical break with the ‘danger from the East’); 1 in cultural terms it facilitated interpenetration with the Western value system (which would instantly confirm that these countries ‘have always belonged’ to the West). Whilst being drawn to the EU by these attractive prospects, the elites of these various countries faced starkly contrasting situations across all spheres of social life: unequal rates of modernisation (relatively early modernising countries such as the Czech Republic as compared with latecomers such as Bulgaria or Serbia); historical experiences of different legal systems (the Austrian and the Ottoman traditions); and religious diversity, combining a range of Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim, or multi-faith populations.