ABSTRACT
Established Western social science theory equates democratization with rising levels of wealth and the associated establishment of a middle class that has an interest in the peaceful resolution of conflict through a political process. The case of Russia under Putin suggests that there is no necessary link between wealth as such and democratization. During his two terms as president, Putin benefited enormously from the rapid rise in world oil prices, but this economic security did not translate into liberal democratic political practices – quite the reverse. Indeed, the swift pace of economic growth and rising standard of living has not pushed Russia’s rulers in the direction of democracy but, rather, has encouraged a form of authoritarianism that in its use of rewards for favourites and supporters is reminiscent of aspects of feudal rule. The Russian middle class, secure in its wealth, is not a bulwark of democratic values, and those who have spoken out – and, more importantly, acted – in support of democratization have been silenced. It is Russia’s poor, rather than the wealthy elite, who are critical of Putin’s anti-democratic actions. The transfer of office from Putin to Medvedev in May 2008 is unlikely to change this tendency.
