ABSTRACT
Environmental ethics is a relatively new branch of philosophical ethics, and this book is designed as an introduction to some of its central issues. Two issues in particular are discussed in some detail. The first is the kind of value that should be attributed to the natural environment, to the things other than human beings, living and non-living, with which we share the world. Should we value them, and be careful in our treatment of them, only because of the manifold ways in which they are useful to us, or do they, or some of them, have value which transcends and is independent of human interests? This is one of the most – perhaps the most – fundamental questions in environmental ethics, and philosophers disagree about the way it should be answered. Those who think that natural objects and natural systems – for example trees, or lakes and forests – have value in themselves, independent of human interests, believe that the recognition of this value commits us to the adoption of new moral principles, that constitute a radical departure from the main moral traditions of the west. This is because they believe that the moral principles embedded in those traditions are irredeemably humancentred, in such a way that the destruction or disfigurement of natural objects and systems are not forbidden unless human beings are harmed by the destructive or disfiguring behaviour. Opposed to philosophers who hold that view are those who believe that what we can find to be valuable in nature must ultimately be determined by human interests, and that although we do indeed need to revise our ideas about how we ought to treat our environment, we can find the resources for this in existing moral traditions.
