ABSTRACT
Events in the last decade around the land question in Zimbabwe and the broader political context in which they have played out have been dramatic and transformational. Sparked by land occupations (locally referred to as jambanja meaning ‘violence’ or ‘angry argument’), and involving contested land expropriation and violent episodes, the process has not surprisingly proved contentious among policy-makers and commentators, nationally and internationally, and among all those who have sought to explain, justify or criticise it. With few exceptions, those who have engaged in writing or political rhetoric have tended to take positions on one or other end of the spectrum in what has been a highly polarised debate, between welcoming a reversal of a racial distribution of land – some of them bewailing the manner of implementation and its distorting of the state – and those who condemn the end, in principle, as well as the means. The fervour surrounding these dramatic events and their explanation was vastly heightened, as well as being framed by, a massively debilitating economic crisis. This was marked by a world record hyperinflation, for the moment resolved, and by a vast shrinkage in GDP. Debate continues as to what extent the overall economic meltdown was caused by or generated declines in post-land reform production or whether and how these processes interacted (see Davies 2005; Mamdani 2008; Scoones et al. 2010; UNDP 2008 for different positions in this debate). The political context was no less dramatic and transformational. A nationalist party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), dominant for 20 years was seriously challenged for the first time by a new party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and reacted with a string of repressive laws and actions. These events also arguably shaped and were shaped by the land reform; one view explored below (Alexander 2006) is that repressive mechanisms were a requirement of enacting FTLRTP.
