ABSTRACT
A decade after the profound political crisis that shook Algeria to its core, the country seems to be regaining its balance. And the drama played out behind closed doors appears to be subsiding. The army was largely uncommunicative throughout the 1990s, but at an October 2002 international conference in Algiers, it began to disclose its version of what had happened during that period and the reasons for the choices it had made. 1 The histories of civil wars are written by their winners, and the Algerian army was seeking to show that it had definitively carried the day against the Front islamique du salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) and the Groupes islamiques armés (GIA, Armed Islamic Groups). What remained was to provide a reading of this decade, an interpretation of recent history that would carry authority. In November 2002, strengthened by his success, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika even offered Ali Belhadj, the number two of the former FIS, an early release from jail in order to promote a policy of ‘Civil Concord’. Formerly considered the Algerian Savonarola, the inspiration for armed groups and the keeper of the party’s legitimacy, Belhadj no longer seemed a source of concern for the Algerian leadership.
