ABSTRACT
Enlargement is often claimed to be the most successful foreign policy of the European Union (EU). It is considered to have contributed to democratic consolidation, respect for human rights, minority protection, conflict resolution, and stability in Eastern Europe. The EU’s political accession conditionality has been the cornerstone of this success. By making a highly attractive external incentive – the benefits coming with membership – conditional on democracy, human rights, and peaceful conflict management, the EU has induced its would-be members to conform to these political norms. There is widespread agreement in the literature that a credible conditional EU membership perspective is indeed a necessary condition for the EU to bring about substantial domestic change. In order to be effective, however, EU conditionality has to fall on fertile domestic ground. In particular, when the political costs of compliance are high for the target government, that is, when fulfilling EU conditions threatens the survival of the regime or the government, even credible membership incentives prove ineffective.
