ABSTRACT
Divided societies around the world require specific institutional arrangements, including electoral rules, to accommodate diversity of interest in ways that can deal with social divisions in a non-violent manner. What might sound like a truism is still frequently challenged in discussions on institutional design for divided societies. While scepticism in academia and among policy makers often focuses on whether democracy is at all possible in divided societies, a large number of countries have been forced to meet this particular challenge in recent decades. In some cases, such as Belgium, long-established democracies have experienced increasing division along linguistic (or ethnic) lines. In others, such as Macedonia, the transition to democracy has occurred under conditions of deep ethnic division and a long-standing antagonism between different communities with very distinct visions of the future of the state in which they live. A third category of cases is constituted by countries in which hegemonic parties in the past have dominated and at times constrained democratic competition, such as in Singapore or in Rwanda, but have subsequently moved towards more competitive elections. The marked divisions along ethnic, religious or racial lines not only inform today’s voters’ choices at the ballot box but they also frequently precede the specific electoral rule and political system in place today.
