ABSTRACT
The evolution of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe over the past 15 years has offered scholars an important opportunity to observe the effects of institutional choice on political behaviour and democratic governance. In a tabula rasa situation, where often entirely new constitutions were adopted and political regimes transformed, the impact of different institutional rules has become more and more evident, and theory has become more refined. 1 Not only have we been able to examine how political actors conform to a new system, but also whether this system has been effective enough to deal with the political and economic challenges that followed. Moreover, these challenges have been two-fold. The immediate task of the early 1990s was to overcome the legacies of one-party rule and command economics. Very soon, however, a second challenge emerged in the form of preparing for accession to the European Union. These two tasks were in fact largely complementary, since the political and economic principles of the Union were precisely those of democracy and capitalism. Yet the political and social tensions that this change would engender nevertheless meant that constitutions and their institutions were certain to be put to the test.
