ABSTRACT

In 2001–2004 Bulgaria and Romania led internationally sponsored small arms and ammunition destruction. A few years later, they all but disappeared from destruction discussions. How to explain the enigma of these two countries’ initial and large-scale action and their later hesitation?

Both cases reveal the importance of external actors in small arms disarmament, in this case, especially the United States. It was Washington that created the initial demand for weapons destruction, as well as later export demands through war in Afghanistan and Iraq. While host authorities in Bulgaria and Romania may want to destroy at least part of their surplus stocks, they seem unwilling to make significant investments of their own. Convincing them to take ownership of the problem and solutions must be the next major objective of donor countries.

The two countries are far from identical. Bulgaria has been more transparent, making informative reports on small arms policy to the United Nations and aiding foreign research into its small arms situation. It has shown somewhat greater interest in the disposal of surplus stocks, designating weapons for future destruction. Romania has been considerably more secretive; only limited information has been made available and the future of its weapons policies is much more obscure. But Romania has created a more reliable basis for future surplus destruction by reducing its armed forces more dramatically, especially its reserve rolls. Bulgaria seems more likely to resume destruction of surpluses, but Romania is likely to eliminate more when it gets around to it.