ABSTRACT
In the sections of this paper preceding this excerpt, we argued that excessive focus on normative theories of correct reasoning, while typical in the literature, are not beneficial to its psychological study. We discussed “logicism” in the sense that many authors believe that people ought to be logical in their reasoning and in some cases try to defend the view that they are. The term “normativism” captures this approach more generally, including the study of statistical inference and decision making. We point out that there is usually more than one normative account available for the same problems, and that authors often try to construct new ones. Hence, one consequences of normativism, we suggest, is a tendency for authors to make unsound “is-ought” inferences, seeking to justify their choice of normative systems by drawing on observed behaviour. In the section reproduced below, we argue that normativist thinking has biased both the conduct and interpretation of empirical research on these topics.
