Though Husserl and his successors were officially opposed to naturalism, phenomenologists have always drawn on empirical sources to some extent. This trend has increased in the last few decades, and it is now common for phenomenologists to draw on psychology, neuroscience, and other cognitive sciences. 1 What is now called ‘naturalized phenomenology’ dates to the 1990s, when Francisco Varela published “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem” (Varela 1996), and a multi-authored volume entitled Naturalized Phenomenology appeared (Petitot et al. 1999). 2 In the late 1990s, the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences was launched and has been active to the present day. Today, ‘naturalized phenomenology’ is a standard phrase, occurring in over 200 journal articles and book chapters to date, 3 and the primary subject of several subsequent anthologies (Embree 2004, Gallagher and Schmicking 2010) and special issues of journals (Carel and Meacham 2013, Hasenkamp and Thomson 2013).