ABSTRACT
In early 2010 the Western engagement in Afghanistan became subject to a significant change of strategy. It might be even fair to say that – in the ninth year of the mission – the U.S. and its allies finally implemented the first strategy for Afghanistan that actually deserved its name. The reason for this was that the stabilization mission in Afghanistan was on the brink of failure due to the constantly growing insurgency, which at this point in time had taken hold in almost every province of the country. This chapter summarizes the evolution of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and the security situation in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2012 in order to provide context. The chapter first recapitulates the developments and strategic mistakes that paved the way for the insurgency and led to the point where the coalition was ultimately forced to make major adjustments in its strategy. Second, the chapter outlines the comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy that was introduced in 2010 in order to transfer full responsibility for security to the Afghan government by 2014. Third, it discusses the implementation and results of the new strategy.
