ABSTRACT
A realist position would see value residing in the objective, mind-independent qualities of things or objects. Subjectivism, in contrasts, states that all values reside in minds and in the eye of the beholder. Objectivism and subjectivism both have their attractions but also their repulsions. Objectivism and subjectivism are both wrong, therefore, if value is a mutual manifestation between mind and world. The chapter argues that despite the relative neglect of the topic, dispositions and dispositionality are absolutely central to ethics. Ethics rests on a number of notions that are either dispositional in character or involve real dispositions – some say powers – at work. The consequence of the dichotomy is to demolish the bridge from metaphysics to ethics. Responsibility seems premised on the grounds that there is something – the object of ethical evaluation – that succeeded in causing an outcome but without necessitation. The dispositional nature of autonomy was evident in notions of agency and responsibility.
