ABSTRACT
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book focuses on the theory of reference developed in Brian Loar's paper “The Semantics of Singular Terms”. It shows how such a view can accommodate Donnellan’s “referential”/“attributive” distinction. The book explores Loar’s more discriminating alternative picture. It also explores some characteristic distinctions in Loar’s work between certain externalist theses about reference and truth conditions on the one hand, and on the other hand certain internalist theses about meaning and content. It argues that there is no obvious account of phenomenological difference, articulating three plausible options and showing why none of them work. The book discusses cognitive phenomenology, and explains how that aspect of conscious thoughts relate to what Montague calls their “sensory-phenomenological” and their “rational” properties. It concludes with the legitimacy of Loar’s conception of subjective intentionality, within a naturalistic philosophy of mind.
