ABSTRACT
The dependence of Putin‘s Russia on fossil fuels has been discussed widely in the realm of politics and the economy, but the main argument in this chapter is that this dependence is of a more profound nature, encompassing the spheres of culture and identity, as well. The research question I pose here is: how does the conservative turn experienced in Russian politics and society, and the underlying economic realities of the Putin regime, affect the way environmental issues and climate change are framed in the Russian domestic debate? Despite the seemingly drastic changes in Russia’s policy brought forth since the Putin’s third term (2012 onwards), I argue that there are continuities in the Russian political culture that frame major societal challenges, including the environmental, facing Russian regimes. Accordingly, Putin‘s return has not contested the policy objectives of modernisation and efficiency that were set during Medvedev’s presidency. However, the justifications for these measures have changed. Since Putin’s re-election, the rhetorical need to please foreign audiences has decreased significantly, and the motivation behind modernisation has now a more economic bias, in addition to harsh geopolitical considerations. These developments, according to our analysis, explain also the changed tone on climate change and strengthening link between fossil energy and Russian identity.
