ABSTRACT
Interspecies variations provide a particularly dramatic illustration of the argument from perceptual variation for at least two reasons. First, the interspecies differences appear to be so large: members of different species don’t just disagree about which of a range of lights or objects instantiate a very specific colour, but potentially perceive completely different kinds of colour. Second, and especially given that the differences are so large, there is strong pressure towards adopting an ecumenical response to the variation. Alternatively, interspecies perceptual variation might be used to motivate disposition list, or more generally relation list, theories of colour, according to which colours are dispositions to produce particular kinds of subjective responses in particular perceivers. Some of the most intriguing questions raised by interspecies variations in colour perception relate to the nature of conscious experience, or ‘what it is like’ to be a pigeon, goldfish, or mantis shrimp.
