ABSTRACT
The analogy between colour and value has typically been employed in order to shed light on the nature of value, primarily because of a (naïve) sense that the nature of colour is clearer than that of value. That is, philosophers have often appealed to colour to support their views about normative or evaluative properties, rather than the other way around. A well-defended and plausible view of colour will lend some of its plausibility to corresponding account of value, unless some relevant disanalogy can be identified. Moreover, the analogy may well suggest various theses about value, and provide lines of defence, that might not otherwise even have been visible. Turning to analogous view about colour, two of the most prominent contemporary colour realists are Alex Byrne and David Hilbert. They argue that colours should be understood as classes of surface spectral reflectances. One claimed difference between colours and values appears in the context of response-dependent approaches to realism about these properties.
