ABSTRACT
One could say of relativism what Hermann Ebbinghaus once observed with respect to psychology: to wit, that it has a “long past but a short history”. Although relativistic motifs have always played a significant role in philosophy, their systematic investigation–and thus the explicit formulation of different forms and strengths of relativism–is a child only of the twentieth century. Normative forms of relativism go further and deny that there are any absolutely true or absolutely correct beliefs or standards. Given pluralism, relativism is compatible with the idea that our current system or bundle is without an existing alternative. Moreover, pluralism permits the relativist to be highly selective in choosing those systems or bundles with respect to which relativism applies. Groundlessness is rarely formulated as a distinct ingredient of epistemic relativism. But it is sometimes invoked in arguments meant to establish the truth of relativism. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.
