ABSTRACT
Many kinds of relativism have been attributed to Karl Marx. We discuss three broad areas of Marx’s thinking: his theories of history, science, and morality. Along the way, we show that Marx is committed to a version of philosophical naturalism that privileges the results of genuine science over alternative ways of understanding the world. This outlook presupposes the possibility of objective knowledge of the world. It follows that Marx is no relativist (at least in the senses we consider). Unlike many non-relativists, however, Marx pays close attention to the problems with which contemporary philosophers interested in relativism are most preoccupied. We show how some later Marxists have mistaken this close attention for evidence that Marx himself is a relativist.
Many kinds of relativism have been attributed to Karl Marx, perhaps none rightly. His writings do address many of the questions with which contemporary philosophers interested in relativism are most preoccupied (e.g. irresolvable moral disagreements between social groups, the evolution of institutions and practices over time, and the prominent, perhaps decisive role played by non-cognitive social factors in belief formation). Probably because Marx pays such close attention to these phenomena, he is often mistaken for a relativist. Lenin, for one, claims that Marx’s philosophical outlook “does contain relativism, but is not reducible to relativism” (Lenin 1972, 154).
