ABSTRACT
Although a connection between pragmatism and relativism is often taken for granted, an investigation into whether and to what extent the core tenets of pragmatism lead to forms of relativism is still needed. This chapter tackles the issue by focusing in particular on alethic relativism and the pragmatist conception of truth, in the different shapes it assumes in the writings of the classical pragmatists: Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. In dealing with Dewey, the discussion will extend to relativism in the cultural and moral domains. In addition to classical pragmatists, the chapter also considers Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, who connected the discussion of relativism with their interpretation of pragmatism itself. Overall, it will be argued that the relationship between pragmatism and relativism is more complex than is usually thought, and that if some aspect of pragmatism can be read in terms of relativism, this kind of relativism is neither paradoxical nor particularly dangerous.
