ABSTRACT
We investigate whether conceptual schemes that differ radically from our own are possible, focussing on the special case of logic in reasoning. Conceptual Pluralism is an issue that has divided, and continues to divide, philosophical opinion. Where Donald Davidson famously denies the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes, latter day followers of Carnap such as Hilary Putnam and Eli Hirsch have been vocal in supporting their reality and importance. Hirsch has, in addition, introduced a novel consideration to the debate, arguing that certain meta-ontological disputes are merely verbal. We start by reviewing Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of untranslatable languages as implied by radically different conceptual schemes, finding his argument rests upon certain tendentious conceptual and empirical assumptions about belief and meaning inherited from Quine. Inaccessible schemes are indeed possible, Davidson to the contrary. We then turn to Hirsch’s version of conceptual pluralism, resting on the thesis of quantifier variance. That thesis, if true, casts doubt on whether certain meta-ontological views are so much as expressible, we argue. Finally, we examine whether logic has any role to play in human reasoning. In cognitive psychology, a leading account of reasoning – Mental Model Theory – denies precisely this. We argue that certain semantic phenomena, attested in and invariant across human languages, require us to recognise logical form and that in failing to do so, the Mental Model account of validity and meaning is flawed. Accessible alternative schemes entirely eschewing logic thus appear impossible.
