ABSTRACT
This chapter is an introduction to philosophical debates about whether there are objectively good reasons for choosing to procreate (or not) in order to raise the child(ren) whom one creates. Most of the commonly cited reasons for having children, including reasons for having more than one child, draw upon consequentialist or deontological assumptions, and are vulnerable to criticisms associated with such theories. And a virtue ethics perspective on procreation, which values women’s reproductive labor, relies on a dubious assumption about the intrinsic value of genetic connection to offspring. According to antinatalists, all such reasons are inadequate because they ignore the well-being of the potential child, who, they argue, will inevitably suffer. But the problem with the antinatalist view is that it takes an implausibly pessimistic view of the quality of human life. Perhaps the best prospect of finding good reasons to procreate lies in the relationship between parent and child.
