ABSTRACT

A theory of being for biology must accommodate the special mode of existence that marks organisms as a distinctive ontological category. Organisms are processual-emergents. That is to say they are constituted of systems that exchange matter and energy with their environments (hence “processual”), through an arrangement of parts and processes that are synthesised, maintained, and regulated by the system as a whole (hence “emergent”). We survey two candidate ontologies—Foundationalist Materialism and hylomorphism—and assess their adequacy as a theory of being for organisms. Foundationalist Materialism is the default ontology for contemporary natural and physical sciences. We argue that it cannot accommodate the emergent nature of organisms. While Foundationalist Materialism accounts for the fact that the capacities of organisms derive from their component parts and processes, it cannot countenance the converse fact that the causal capacities of an organism’s components are derived from the organism as a whole. Aristotle’s hylomorphism, however, adequately captures the reciprocity that holds between an organism and its component parts and processes. Hylomorphism makes sense of organismal emergence. The proper scientific study of organisms suggests that they should be considered as interactions between Aristotelian matter and form.