ABSTRACT
In advanced democracies, populism emerges and results not only from the conditions of the socio-economic context but particularly takes advantage of a failure of the traditional political elite. The elite’s loss of legitimacy is not caused by populist parties, but, to the contrary, it is rather the case that populist parties can prosper due to an already evolving process of delegitimization that traditional elites are subject to. Due to the disputed nature of the traditional political class, different forms of anti-politics may emerge, taking the form of an oppositional sentiment on the level of the masses, which can either manifest itself as apathy or detachment or take the form of an active anti-politics. In this, the relationship between anti-politics and populism represents a series of contradictions, in relation to the degree of radicalism in the dispute against incumbent political representation. It would be misleading in this case to superimpose the concept of anti-politics into populism; it would be equally be misleading to superimpose populist democracy onto any type of dispute against the incumbent democratic political system.
Populism tends to graft itself into ideologies that are already present in the political conflict, with parties and leaders that, even if considered as anti-establishment outsiders, are characterized as anti-party parties of the new radical right and new radical left and not as traditional anti-system parties. What is more, populism intended as a political-ideological movement put into action by leaders and parties exists by virtue of the fact that it is representative democracy itself that makes possible populism’s political-electoral rise and manifestation.
