ABSTRACT
Using the method of Descriptive Experience Sampling, some subjects report experiences of thinking that do not involve words or any other symbols [Hurlburt, R. T., and C. L. Heavey. 2006. Exploring Inner Experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Hurlburt, R. T., and S. A. Akhter. 2008. “Unsymbolized Thinking.” Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4): 1364–1374]. Even though the possibility of this unsymbolized thinking has consequences for the debate on the phenomenological status of cognitive states, the phenomenon is still insufficiently examined. This paper analyzes the main properties of unsymbolized thinking (UT) and advances an explanation of its origin. According to our analysis, unsymbolized thoughts appear as propositional states, that is, they are experienced as compositional conceptual phenomena, with semantic and syntactic features analogous to those of the contents of utterances. Based on this characterization, we hypothesize that UT is continuous with the activity of inner speech, in particular, it is a form of inner speech where the speech action is aborted even before the intention to talk is implemented by motor commands. We contend that this account provides the best explanation of the distinctive features of the phenomenon, and it helps to understand the sense of agency and ownership associated with it. Finally, we consider a possible objection arising from the experience of unworded inner speech, and we show how our account should inform the debate about cognitive phenomenology.
