ABSTRACT
In the summer of 1972, the Soviet Union and Egypt staged an elaborate deception exercise that created a widespread concept whereby Egyptian President Sadat had ‘expelled the Soviet advisers’ from his country. This was presented as signalling a rift due to Moscow’s refusal to supply Egypt with weaponry for an offensive against Israel. The success of this deception led to global surprise, and Israeli unpreparedness, when this offensive was launched in October 1973 with full Soviet support. The British embassy in Cairo was particularly susceptible to disinformation, despite the expertise of the ambassador in Arab affairs and of the defence attaché/MI6 agent in Soviet matters. Among other causes, their analysis was tinged by aspiration to restore British influence in Egypt and especially to replace the USSR as main arms provider. This chapter describes several of the most egregious examples, which although discredited within a few months did not detract from the diplomats’ reputations and standing.
