ABSTRACT
This chapter deals with some philosophical problems connected with research in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), in particular with problems arising from two central claims, namely that computers exhibit 'intelligence', 'consciousness' and other 'inner' processes and that they 'simulate' human 'intelligence' and cognitive processes in general. The aims of AI have been formulated in different ways, the most prominent being the one by Marvin Minsky, who calls AI 'the science of making machines do things that would require intelligence if done by men'. The most prominent argument against AI, which has been extensively discussed by philosophers, was introduced by Kurt Godel a long time before the 'birth' of AI as a means to demonstrate the limits of formal logic and mathematics. Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'philosophy of psychology' originated within a context which was steeped in behaviorist criticisms of traditional, introspectionist psychology.
