ABSTRACT
One distinctive advance has been the comparatively recent Soviet publication of German military documents and records, the unavailability of which seriously hampered any realistic analysis of German plans and preparations and the Soviet response. At the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, where 'only a small group of Soviet diplomats was obliged to remain behind', and most made ready to enjoy the promise of a fine day on 21 June. Struck at their joints and hinges, the three Soviet Fronts were buckling and swaying alarmingly even after a few hours of military operations. On the flanks of the Soviet German front Soviet forces were restricted to 'defensive assignments'. Within three days, with the same catastrophic tale repeated elsewhere, Marshal Timoshenko was forced to recognize that the great counterstroke envisaged by Directive No. 3 had failed: the Soviet frontier armies were for the most part broken and shattered, leaving them wholly incapable of checking the German advance.
