ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that Abraham Lincoln was a conventional mid-nineteenth-century military strategist who fully shared the ideas of Henry W. Halleck, George B. McClellan, and his other West Point-trained generals. The military sophistication which the President had acquired in less than a year and a half extended to a clear understanding of the significance of battles and appreciation of the limited degree to which the Confederates had defeated McClellan at the Seven Days Battles. President Lincoln's attention was still riveted upon operations in Virginia when Lee crossed the Potomac in what Halleck, Lincoln's new General-in-Chief, termed a raid. Like the Peninsular school, the proponents of Lincoln also have difficulty generalizing their interpretation to the other theatres of the war. Lincoln's strategy was thus Scott's anaconda plan, as the President sought to open the Mississippi and strengthen the blockade. Lincoln as strategist was orthodox militarily, relying on professional military advice.
