ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a realist version of liberal theory. Realist liberalism denies that societies must (or can) rest on even a thin normative consensus; disbelieves in regulative ideals; and decouples liberal politics and social critique from neo-Kantian projects of rational justification. Drawing inspiration from the Scottish rather than the German Enlightenment, it focuses instead on institutional divisions of labor, unintended consequences, and the furtherance of human interests that are partly common and partly clashing. It analyzes a variety of institutions and practices – including the rule of law, the market, the welfare state, competitive representative and partisan democracy, toleration, and free speech – that reveal themselves in practice to serve a wide and indefinite variety of human interests. Each of these and other liberal institutions enable a particular range of human purposes. And each may be subjected to normative critique to the extent that it excludes important sectors of society from its benefits, is unfairly rigged by powerful actors, or displays systematic and excessive bias with regard to the range of interests it promotes.
