Introduction

The status of logical form as the limit of language surfaces in Wittgenstein’s treatment of propositions of logic. Wittgenstein’s conception of the limits of meaningful language leaves the Tractatus itself in a puzzling position. The obvious motivation for the resolute reading is Wittgenstein’s statement about the nonsensicality of the sentences of the Tractatus. According to the Kantian interpretation, Wittgenstein’s statement that “logic is transcendental” ought to be read in a specifically Kantian sense. According to Peter Sullivan, Wittgenstein is indeed concerned with transcendental idealism in the passages of the Tractatus that discuss the metaphysical subject. In 1931, Wittgenstein connects the idea of a limit of language explicitly to the Kantian tradition. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that the task of the philosopher is to describe language games, that is, practice-laden ways of using language, without explaining or justifying them in any way. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.