ABSTRACT
The aim of the chapter is threefold. First, to argue that Descartes in response to the question “How ought one to live?” offers a conception of what will here be called moral virtue. According to this conception, moral virtue is constituted by the only good or perfection that is up to us, namely the correct use of free will. Second, to show that while moral virtue, in Descartes’ view, is necessary for obtaining happiness in one’s life, it is not by itself sufficient for doing so. Moral virtue is sufficient for happiness only in conjunction with the knowledge that nothing in our lives, except for the use that we make of free will, could be otherwise, and that as long as one shows moral virtue in one’s conduct there is therefore no respect in which one’s life could be better or more perfect than it actually is. Third, to explicate and defend the presence in Descartes’ ethics of an often overlooked distinction in virtue: between moral virtue on the one hand, and a second and more elevated form perfect virtue, as it will be called here on the other. Perfect virtue is constituted by the combination of moral virtue and the knowledge that was seen to be required in order for moral virtue to be sufficient for happiness. However, since the knowledge that is part of perfect virtue is not, according to Descartes, in our own power, perfect virtue does not constitute the proper end or goal for each individual to aim at in their conduct.
