ABSTRACT
Hegel’s approach to sociopolitical normativity can be understood as a response to problems that are also faced by contemporary constructivists and realists. From Hegel’s perspective, realists may be able to account for the nonrelative status of norms’ content. But they undermine the notion of individual freedom. Meanwhile, constructivists’ ability to defend individual freedom comes at the cost of rendering normative content contingent. To avoid these problems, both Aristotle and Kant devise hybrid accounts. However, Aristotle’s fundamental commitment to objectivist substance-metaphysics undermines individual choice. Meanwhile, Kant’s prioritization of unconditioned individual subjectivity over normative content renders norms subjective. In order to retain both choice-guaranteeing subjectivity and content-defining objectivity, Hegel bases his argument on the metaphysics of “the concept of the will.” Within its unity, the differentiated moments of (1) choosing individual subjectivity, and (2) content-defining objectivity are irreducible and mediate each other: the individual subject freely chooses to do the objectively right thing.
