ABSTRACT
The Experimental phenomenologis origin is the descriptive psychology introduced by Franz Brentano and promulgated by the “Brentano circle” to the threshold of a new approach in the philosophy of mind and a new approach in empirical psychology. This aspiration became figurative in philosophical phenomenology and literal in Experimental Phenomenology, but the common origin left its mark on both disciplines. Researchers interested in the first-person perspective of Experimental Phenomenology increasingly turn to third-person methods of natural science, as is often the case in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. The nature of the paradoxes of Experimental Phenomenology described by Paolo Bozzi raises the questions of whether it is the latter, heterodox approach that is more likely to produce a comprehensive “science of mental phenomena.” An absolute boundary is found where visibility approaches zero. The boundary could be replaced by a transitional interval between low and high visibility.
