ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to develop a theory of luck often referred to as the “Lack of Control Account of Luck” (LCAL). It discusses LCAL as an account of moral luck and examines the prospects of LCAL as a universal theory of luck. LCAL grew out of a version which pitted so-called “accessibility internalism,” which emphasizes the importance of the believer’s epistemic responsibility, and reliabilist externalism, which emphasizes the reliability of belief-forming processes at generating true beliefs. LCAL has a separate origin in the literature discussing the phenomenon of “moral luck.” LCAL is a strongly intuitive account of luck. It underwrites plausible and insightful views about moral luck and about knowledge, and there is some prospect for its extension to a fully universal account of luck. Many new theories of justification and knowledge were promulgated with ever more elaborate conditions designed to capture what is essential to knowledge while eliminating the pernicious element of luck.
