ABSTRACT
Control of nuclear arms became the main topic of the two super-powers' diplomacy in the 1970s. There was an element of paradox in the exercise. Both sides knew that no agreement on limiting their nuclear arsenals could preclude the possibility of disaster. The curse of the Bomb made the absolute national security that the United States possessed in being protected by two great oceans a thing of the past. It also became a frighteningly equalizing factor in international relations. The United States' acceptance of inferiority in land-based strategic weapons was based on the sensible assumption that its overall position in nuclear weapons was adequate to deter a Soviet nuclear strike, and that beyond certain number, quantitative superiority in strategic weapons was meaningless. The Soviet Union entered nuclear arms control negotiations only after it had accumulated a considerable arsenal of the weapons, and after its rulers, in strained relations with China, had an obvious incentive to seek détente with the West.
