ABSTRACT
There is a superficial similarity between Theophrastus’ remarks on the intellect and his brief work on metaphysics. In both, he is chiefly concerned with specific doctrines of Aristotle, and the character of his discussion is for the most part aporetic. The way in which the aporiai are treated, however, is interestingly different in the two cases. In the Metaphysics it is clear that Theophrastus is genuinely skeptical in regard to a number of important Aristotelian views; he regards his aporiai as posing the sort of difficulties that call for major revisions, not minor adjustments. 1 The aporiai concerning Aristotle’s theory of the intellect, on the other hand, are not seen as posing serious challenges; they are used as a way of clarifying the difficult and obscure discussions in De Anima (DA) III 4 and 5. Virtually every question raised receives an answer, or at least a suggestion of an answer. And Theophrastus’ suggestions seem to be neither departures from, nor developments of, Aristotelian views, but rather reformulations of those views with the aim of clarifying what Aristotle had in mind in a particular passage. It is sometimes thought that the main purpose of Theophrastus’ remarks is to raise difficulties about a number of Aristotle’s claims, and that any clarification provided along the way is incidental. My view of his aim is quite different; I see him as trying to anticipate the sorts of misunderstandings and questions a reader is likely to have as he feels his way through the maze of Aristotle’s discussion of the “passive” and “productive” intellect 2 —a guide for the perplexed reader of DA III 4 and 5. The argument for my view will consist of an examination of several of the fragments, indicating in particular cases how Theophrastus’ aporiai are designed not so much to challenge as to clarify Aristotle’s views. If clarification was indeed his aim, then we have 33all the more reason to look to these fragments for help in deciphering Aristotle’s cryptic messages concerning the intellect.
