ABSTRACT
This chapter provides examples of suboptimal social outcomes as a reflection of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. It offers a concise theoretical approach to analyzing these types of outcomes by utilizing Robert Axelrod's important work on the evolution of cooperation among competing players. The chapter explores the necessary conditions for groups to effectively interact over the long-term by applying the model to important social issues. The path-breaking work of Robert Axelrod demonstrates that the evolution of cooperation among egoists is enhanced when separate groups have a high probability of continually interfacing with the concomitant condition that each of them has a stake in their mutual future interactions. The evolution of cooperation requires that groups have a sufficiently high chance to meet repeatedly so that they mutually have a high stake in their future interaction. With the emergence of black political control of the central city, there has been a retreat in surrounding metropolitan area and state-level structural support for interracial cooperation.
