ABSTRACT
Tim Frankenberger agreed on the problem of incentives within the Bank. The Bank's culture was, "people are all terribly sophisticated analysts of something disciplinary." Between requiring no evaluation in the Bank's approval process and overwhelming nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with requests for information, there was surely a happy medium. The Bank would be better off focusing on a few outcomes than having NGOs measure their procurement rates. The Bank needed to get people talking about these issues as a factor in performance. The Bank's culture was, "people are all terribly sophisticated analysts of something disciplinary." Bank staff were responsible for judging the quality of the Bank's intentions; the borrowers really bore the risk. Maybe the Bank should share some of that risk. If the Bank did that, the incentives for doing evaluations would change remarkably. As for complexity, Bank and government resources had become increasingly constrained, so the Bank's ambitions were increasingly unattainable.
