ABSTRACT
Most modern theories of Pavlovian conditioning have been so-called S–S theories; that is, to have supposed that Pavlovian conditioning involves the development of associations between representations of the stimuli encountered in training. Pavlov’s (1927) original interpretation was of this form, presuming the formation of new functional connections between centers for the conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) in the animal’s brain. On such perspective, many of the fundamental theoretical questions about Pavlovian conditioning center around how one should construe the conditioning stimuli as being coded or processed. A common theoretical device for describing such stimulus processing is through the assumption that CSs and UCSs activate representative elements or components that have prescribed occasions of occurrence. The theories of Pavlovian conditioning to which we have contributed (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981; Wagner & Brandon, 1989) have used this device, as does the theory we present here. Much of the substance of such theory, as shown, is in the theoretical rules that relate elemental activity to the conditions of stimulation.
