ABSTRACT
The ability to represent experience has been viewed by psychologists as generic to the child and a prerequisite for development (Bruner, 1966; Piaget, 1962; Sigel, 1970; Vygotsky, 1978; Werner, 1957). These theoreticians also believe that changes in the nature of mental representations lie at the core of the developing child’s increase in cognitive abilities. Although definitions of representation are usually designed to capture the specific theoretical biases underpinning different theories and perspectives of development, most share a common view of representation as the ability to create and to maintain an internal trace—a representation—of experience. The age at which the newborn infant unequivocally demonstrates the ability to represent experience has been revised downward continuously as this issue has been increasingly examined. For example, a recent study reported that infants as young as 6 weeks old can generate actions on the basis of stored representations (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1994).
