ABSTRACT
By the end of the twentieth century, developmental systems theory emerged as a superordinate frame for several different models of human development. As discussed in previous chapters, these instances of developmental systems theory (e.g., Ford & Lerner, 1992; Gottlieb, 1992, 1997; Lerner, 1995a, 1996, 1998b; Lewis, 1997; Magnusson, 1995, 1996, 1999a, 1999b; Sameroff, 1983; Thelen & Smith, 1998; Wapner & Demick, 1998; see, too, Feldman, 2000; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Rogoff, 1998) may be regarded as members of the same theoretical “family”: All “family members” reject nature-nurture “split” concepts of reality and causation (Overton, 1998) and, in turn, adopt a relational and integrated (or fused) conception of the multiple levels of organization involved in the ecology of human development (Schneirla, 1957; Tobach, 1981).
