ABSTRACT
False memories have been studied by cognitive psychologists for decades, dating at least to the pioneering studies of Bartlett (1932). False memories are important theoretically because they emphasize that memory is not a literal reproduction of the past but instead depends on constructive processes that are sometimes prone to errors, distortions, and illusions (for recent reviews, see Estes, 1997; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay 1993; Roediger, 1996; Schacter, 1995, 1996). As highlighted by the other contributions to this volume, contemporary cognitive psychologists have been intensively concerned with false memories and constructive aspects of remembering, in part as a result of real-world controversies concerning the suggestibility of children’s memory (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Schacter, Kagan, & Leichtman, 1995) and the accuracy of memories recovered in psychotherapy (e.g., Lindsay & Read, 1996; Loftus, 1993; Schacter, Koutstaal, & Norman, 1997).
