ABSTRACT
At either an implicit or explicit level, the notion of an intrinsic deficit in the processing of information has been central to the construct of specific learning disabilities throughout its early and more recent history. Long before Samuel Kirk (Kirk, 1962) proposed the term learning disabilities as a label for this elusive category of developmental inefficiencies, clinical reports of specific cases alluded to intrinsic or congenital causes. Hinshelwood’s (1917) now famous accounts of congenital word blindness are good examples, as are Orton’s (1937) accounts of spelling and oral language disorders. In fact, with few exceptions (e.g., Mann, REF), explicit categorical arguments against the concept of a processing deficit as a cause of learning disabilities have been made only by certain clinical and behavioral psychologists arguing for origins in atypical patterns of family dynamics (e.g., Green, 1989) or reinforcement of unwanted behaviors (e.g., Koorland, 1986) rather than in intrinsic deficits. Even those scholars who have argued strongly against the inclusion of a “process clause” in the learning disabilities definition have done so more out of a sense that the construct has little heuristic value for intervention than out of a conviction that it is an inherently misguided notion. Similarly, even the harshest critics of the field of learning disabilities (e.g., Coles, 1987; Poplin, 1988) have tended to acknowledge the existence of intrinsic process deficits in specific cases while focusing their discussion on the widespread over-extension of this core notion.
