ABSTRACT
Although a number of factors contribute to an individual’s ability to identify the source of actions (e.g., Day, Howie, & Markham, 1998; Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983; Foley, Santini, & Sopasakis, 1989; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Raye & Johnson, 1980), involvement of what has been called “cognitive operations information” is critical to making source discriminations. The anticipation, initiation, and production of one’s own actions, real or imagined, are mediated by cognitive operations (e.g., Foley et al., 1983; Raye, & Johnson, 1980). In the source-monitoring model, these operations are represented in memory and later serve to facilitate agent discrimination (e.g., self vs. other, subject vs. experimenter). Individuals may be able to identify their own actions, in part, because of the cognitive operations mediating their performance. For example, children and adults may anticipate how they would perform an action, anticipate the action’s consequences, or reflect on the cognitive effort associated with the enactment itself. Remembering these operations would then influence source discrimination.
