ABSTRACT
Scientists have attempted to delineate the key components of scientific thinking and scientific methods for at least 400 years (e.g., Bacon, 1620/1854; Galilei, 1638/1991; Klahr, 2000; Tweney, Doherty, & 71:320 Mynatt, 1981). Understanding the nature of the scientific mind has been an important and central issue not only for an understanding of science but also what it is to be human. Given the enduring and wide-ranging interest in the scientific mind, there has been a multiplicity of ways used to investigate the genesis of scientific concepts, theories, and hypotheses. Most important to bear in mind is that many of the methods that have been used to understand science have been tied to changes in their respective fields of study. In philosophy, for example, the switch from an analytical to a more historically based approach resulted in major shifts in an understanding of science (Callebaut, 1992). Likewise, in psychological studies of scientific thinking there has been continuous discourse between advocates of naturalistic studies of human behavior and advocates of highly controlled experiments (Dunbar, 2000; Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001; Tweney et al., 1981). In fact, naturalistic versus highly constrained or controlled investigations has been a central issue that cuts across many disciplines (Lave, 1998; Suchman, 1987). Numerous books, articles, and conferences have been held that espouse one way of conducting research as being better or more “authentic” than others. Over the past decade, we have taken a more unifying approach by combining naturalistic with experimental methods. We have conducted what we have called in vivo naturalistic studies of scientists thinking and reasoning “live” in their laboratories (Dunbar, 1993b, 1995, 1997, 2002). We have also conducted what we have called in vitro research, where we have used controlled experiments to investigate specific aspects of scientific thinking (e.g., Baker & Dunbar, 2000). The topics that we chose to investigate in our laboratory were the ones that we identified in our in vivo studies. Using this approach, we were able to discover new aspects of analogical thinking that clarify both our understanding of scientific thinking in general and analogy in particular (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000, 2001, 2002; Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001 ).
