ABSTRACT
An examination of the literature on decision making reveals a surprising neglect of the attitude construct. Although the evaluative processes that are fundamental to choice have been a basic staple of attitudes research for decades, this enormous body of work is commonly ignored in discussions of decision making. Decision theorists infrequently make references to predictive models of attitudes and behavior such as information integration theory (e.g., Anderson, 1974) and the theory of reasoned action (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). More significantly, research on the basic processes through which attitudes guide behavior and decisions are rarely considered in theories of choice. Generally, attitudes are not even conceived to play a role in most accounts of how decisions are made. We suggest that the neglect of attitudes theory reflects more the narrow scope of most scientific endeavor (see Kruglanski, 2001) and the lack of familiarity with the attitudes literature more than the lack of an important role of attitudes in decision making.
