ABSTRACT
The constructs of empathy and sympathy have been discussed by philosophers interested in morality for many years (e.g., Blum, 1980; Hume, 1748/1975). In addition, for decades, numerous psychologists have assigned empathy and sympathy a central role in moral development, especially as a factor that motivates prosocial behavior (e.g., helping and sharing) and inhibits aggression toward others (Batson, 1991; Feshbach, 1975; Hoffman, 1982; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988; Staub, 1979). People who experience others’ emotion and feel concern for them are expected to be motivated to help and not hurt other people. In addition, sympathy is viewed by some theorists as contributing to the development and elicitation of higher level moral reasoning (e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller, 2001;Hoffman, 2000). Empathy and sympathy can direct attention to others’ needs; empathymayengender feelings of concern for others in pain, need, or distress; and empathy and sympathymay reorganize ways of thinking about others’ needs and the effects of one’s behavior on others (Hoffman, 2000; Zahn-Walxer, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 1979). Thus, empathy and sympathy are believed to contribute to an orientation towards others’ feelings and needs, which is incorporated in moral reasoning and reflected in social behavior (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, 2000). Moreover, sympathy can be viewed in its own right as a moral emotion that is a part of moral values, reasoning, and behavior.
